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Chagossian people to their archipelago, seem likely to continue to raise the issue in whatever
domestic or international forum is willing to consider their complaint. No doubt they will rely
in such future litigation on the ICJ’s supportive opinion.
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On April 8, 2016, the Egyptian government announced1 the signing of a “Convention
of Demarcation of the Maritime Border” with Saudi Arabia (Convention).2 Under the
Convention, the Red Sea Islands of Tiran and Sanaﬁr lay in Saudi territory. The move was
perceived by foreign and domestic observers as the abandonment by Egypt of a long-held
territorial and maritime claim in exchange for a loan from Saudi Arabia,3 and it was chal-
lenged before the Egyptian courts. On January 16, 2017, the Egyptian Supreme
Administrative Court rendered a judgment annulling the act of cession of the islands4 on
the basis of the Egyptian people’s entitlement over them (Judgment).5 The Judgment trig-
gered a domestic judicial saga, which only ended in 2018.6 Aside from the intriguing political
dimensions of this incident, the Judgment, while interpreting the Egyptian Constitution of
2014, sheds light on some fundamental aspects of international law, namely: the identity of
the “holder” of sovereignty and its relations with the “delegatee,” i.e., the government; the
contribution of human rights as an analytical frame for this issue; and the validity of a treaty
concluded in violation of a state’s treaty-making powers, a question for which there is limited
practice.
1 Government: Sanaﬁr and Tiran Islands Within Saudi Territorial Waters, ALMASRYALYOUM (Apr. 9, 2016), at
https://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/926066.
2 Convention of Demarcation of the Maritime Boundaries Between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Apr. 8, 2016 (Arabic original) [hereinafter Convention].
3 Heba Saleh, Egypt Parliament Approves Giving Red Sea Islands to Saudi Arabia, FIN. TIMES (June 14, 2017), at
https://www.ft.com/content/9aaf0e00-5113-11e7-bfb8-997009366969; Timothy E. Kaldas, Tahrir Institute for
Middle East Policy,Tiran, Sanaﬁr, and the Island of Executive Power in Egypt (Apr. 21, 2016), at https://timep.org/
commentary/analysis/tiran-sanaﬁr-and-the-island-of-executive-power-in-egypt.
4 The President of the Republic et al. v. Ali Ayyoub et al., Judgment, 2017 Supreme Administrative Court, on
appeal No. 74236/62 J S (Jan. 16, 2017) [hereinafter Judgment].
5 The case-note is based on an unofﬁcial translation of the Judgment made by a professional translator, to be
found as an annex to the Communication 115, 2017 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights
(ACHPR), ACHR/Comm/115/18 (Nov. 2). The document is on ﬁle with the author and theAJILEditorial Board.
6 Case No. 37 and 49, Judgment, 2018 Supreme Constitutional Court, Year 38 (Mar. 3) [hereinafter Judgment
SCC 2018].
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The signing of the Convention caused an immediate public uproar.7 The term “demarca-
tion,” used in its title, implied a purported prior boundary “delimitation,” despite Egypt’s
long-held claim over the islands. Two Egyptian lawyers, together with 181 Egyptian citizens,
brought an action against the signing by the Egyptian President al-Sisi of the Convention.
The Administrative Court rendered its judgment on June 21, 2016,8 annulling the act of
signature as contrary to the Egyptian Constitution. The enforceable character of this judg-
ment was conﬁrmed by two decisions of the Administrative Court on November 8,
2016.9 On January 16, 2017, the Supreme Administrative Court, the highest and last
instance court of the Egyptian Council of State,10 issued a Judgment conﬁrming the ﬁrst
instance decision and ordering the annulment of the act of signature with immediate effect.
However, the Egyptian government ignored the decision of the Supreme Administrative
Court, which was challenged through two channels. First, a private suit was brought before
the Cairo Court for Urgent Matters (Cairo Court) claiming that the Administrative Courts
had overstepped their jurisdiction.11 Second, the government pursued the ratiﬁcation of the
Convention despite the decisions of the Administrative Courts.12 Eventually, the Supreme
Constitutional Court, which was seized of a “conﬂict of jurisdictions” between the
Administrative Courts and the Cairo Court, rendered an essentially procedural decision
declaring itself “exclusively competent to adjudicate” on the Convention under Article 192
of the Constitution.13 It noted that the agreement was an act of sovereignty within the exclu-
sive purview “held by the executive and legislative authorities,”14 only reviewable by the
SupremeConstitutional Court. Ultimately, the Court concluded that because of the violation
of the separation of powers by the highest administrative court and the Cairo Court, there was
no remaining issue on the merits to adjudicate: “Accordingly, this Court has decided not to
accept the dispute, since the decision to request a stay of execution of the ruling has become
irrelevant.”15 The Supreme Constitutional Court did not address the issue of the islands’ ces-
sion; it focused instead only on the lower courts’ infractions, invalidating their rulings.
Nowhere does the judgment examine the unconstitutionality of the Convention itself.
In the meantime, on November 2, 2017, the Egyptian lawyers who had brought the initial
action before the Administrative Courts ﬁled a communication with the African Commission
7 JaredMalsin, The Fate of Two Deserted Islands Has Egyptians Taking to the Streets Again, TIME (Apr. 15, 2016),
at https://time.com/4296334/egypt-protests-tiran-sanaﬁr-islands.
8 Ali Ayyoub et al. v. The President of the Republic et al, Judgment, 2016 Administrative Court, no 43709/70 J,
(June 21) [hereinafter Judgment 2016].
9 Decision, 2016 AC, No. 68737/70 J (Nov. 8), on the Petition Filed by the President of the Republic, the
Government and the Speaker of the House of Representatives for the Stay of Enforcement of the Judgment of 21
June 2016. Decision, 2016 AC, No. 66959/70 J (Nov. 8), on the Petition Filed by Mr Khaled Ali for the
Continuation of Enforcement of the Judgment of 21 June 2016.
10 In Egypt, the State Council refers to the entire administrative court system.
11 Decision, 2016 Cairo Court, (Sept. 29), suspended the Administrative Court Judgment 2016. Decision,
2017 Cairo Court (Apr. 2), concluding that the Administrative Courts, namely both the Administrative Court
and the Supreme Administrative Court, had no jurisdiction over the dispute concerning the signature of the Treaty
of Transfer and their judgments were devoid of legal effect. The Cairo Court has no jurisdiction over such matters.
Ex Law No. 13/1968, 1968 Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure, Arts. 27, 45 (Jan. 1).
12 On August 2017, President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi ratiﬁed the Convention. See Decree of Ratiﬁcation, The
Ofﬁcial Gazette, Egypt, No. 33 of 17 August 2017.
13 Judgment SCC 2018, supra note 6, 13.
14 Id. at 12.
15 Id. at 20.
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on Human and Peoples’ Rights claiming that Egypt, in transferring the islands to Saudi
Arabia, had violated several provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights.16 At the time of writing, the status of the communication is unclear, as no mention
is made on the website of the African Commission. However, after the ratiﬁcation of the
Convention, public sources conﬁrm that Egypt handed over the islands to Saudi Arabia,
which, since February 2018, has control over them.17
In this rather complex body of legal suits and judicial decisions, the Judgment plays a piv-
otal role both procedurally—because of the subsequent litigation to set aside this decision—
and substantively—because it addresses the main legal issues of this saga of interest to inter-
national lawyers. The premise of the Supreme Administrative Court’s reasoning is that Article
4 of the Egyptian Constitution of 201418 recognizes the people of Egypt as the source of sov-
ereignty, and that, through the Constitution, the Egyptian people withheld from the execu-
tive and the legislative powers the authority to enter into agreements relating to “rights of
sovereignty” or ceding Egyptian territory. According to the Judgment:
The Egyptian Constitution has established the principle of sovereignty of the people in its
highest form so it prohibited any kind of international obligation on the State in respect
of these types of treaties [those relating to the rights of sovereignty] except after getting
the approval of the People which is the owner and the source of the sovereignty. (P. 11)
The key provision of the Constitution is Article 151, which states in its second paragraph that
“[v]oters must be called for referendum on the treaties . . . related to the rights of sovereignty.”19
Moreover, under the third paragraph of this provision, the government is precluded from
concluding treaties that result “in ceding any part of State territories.”
The Administrative Courts based their decisions on the latter provision, assuming that the
islands were under Egyptian sovereignty. In fact, Egypt has long asserted territorial claims
over the islands,20 which at the time of the Judgment were also under its effective adminis-
tration.21 According to the Supreme Administrative Court, the act of relinquishment of the
islands constituted:
a serious historical mistake—unprecedented—which affects the territory of the home-
land owned by the People of Egypt, whether the previous generations, the present gen-
eration and the future generations; it is not the property of any authority of the State.
(Pp. 38–39)
16 Communication 115, 2017 ACHPR, ACHR/Comm/115/18 (Nov. 2); see Egypt Activists Take Int’l Legal
Action Against Island Deal with Saudi Arabia, PRESSTV (Mar. 13 2018), at https://www.presstv.com/DetailFr/
2018/03/13/555310/Egypt-islands-deal-Saudi-Arabia-lawsuit-African-Union.
17 See Western Diplomat: Saudi Arabia Received the Island of Tiran from Egypt, I24NEWS (Feb. 6 2018), at
https://www.i24news.tv/ar/ ﺃـﺧـﺒﺎﺭ /middle-east/167052-180206- ﺩـﺑـﻠﻮـﻣﺎـﺳﻴ-ـﻏﺮـﺑﻴ:-ﺍـﻟـﺴـﻌﻮﺩـﻳﺔ-ـﺗـﺴﻠّــﻤﺘ-ـﺟﺰـﻳﺮﺓ-ـﺗـﻴﺮﺍﻧ-ـﻣﻨ-ـﻣـﺼﺮ ;
Saudi Economic Zone Planned for Tiran and Sanaﬁr Islands,MADAMASR (Oct. 25 2017), at https://madamasr.com/
en/2017/10/25/news/u/saudi-economic-zone-planned-for-tiran-and-sanaﬁr-islands.
18 It provides that “[s]overeignty belongs only to the people, who shall exercise and protect it. The people are the
source of powers . . . .”
19 2014 Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt (Jan. 15) (emphasis added).
20 See, e.g., UNSC Ofﬁcial Records, 659th mtg., para. 133 (Feb. 15, 1954) [hereinafter Feb. 15, 1954 UNSC
Ofﬁcial Records].
21 Judgment 2016, supra note 8, 21 et seq.; Judgment, supra note 4, 23 et seq.
INTERNATIONAL DECISIONS2019 793
The Supreme Administrative Court emphasized that Article 151, third paragraph, had the
effect of prohibiting any agreements for the cession of any part of the Egyptian territory, irre-
spective of a referendum:
The alienation of any part of the territory of the State or the conclusion of a treaty con-
trary to the provisions of the Egyptian Constitution—individually or collectively—are
matters in respect of which it is forbidden to conclude any international agreement
and may not be submitted to the people who declared its will through its constitution
and its consequence is that it is not acceptable to cede any part of the territory or violate
any provision of the Constitution. (P. 11)
The Supreme Administrative Court also discussed the operation of the procedural rights
reserved by Article 151’s second paragraph. Treaties relating to “rights of sovereignty,” other
than treaties ceding state territory, remain subject to the direct approval of the Egyptian
people by referendum. The role of the government in relation to such treaties is merely
conﬁrmatory of the will of the Egyptian people, as expressed through their vote:
The second paragraph [of Article 151 of the Egyptian Constitution] has limited the role
of House of Representatives to the conﬁrmation of what the people decides at the end, in
his capacity as proxy of the Constituent sovereign . . . . The power of the House of
Representatives in matters of sovereignty is a conﬁrmation authority of the people’s
will and its opinion in this respect is to complete that will; the proxy merges with the
principal and the proxy’s role is limited to formulate the expression of this will, be it a
rejection or an approval. (P. 15)
Following this reasoning, the Egyptian Parliament—the agent—could not have substi-
tuted its will for the will of the Egyptian people—the principal. Article 151 of the
Egyptian Constitution thus identiﬁes matters that are beyond the powers of the government
and are directly subject to the people (i.e., treaties relating to rights of sovereignty) andmatters
that are outside even the current will of the people, remaining prohibited by the expressed will
of the people who approved and constituted the 2014 Constitution (i.e., treaties ceding state
territories).
The Court ultimately found a fundamental violation of constitutional provisions regulat-
ing the treaty-making powers of the state (pp. 15, 23–38, 44). The Egyptian government
manifestly violated this internal law, making the conclusion of the Convention invalid. Thus,
the administrative measure called by the Egyptian Government in its Appeal report a
Preliminary Agreement to demarcate the borders, and the subsequent relinquishment
of the two islands—whatever are its reasons—since they are part of the Egyptian territory,
are contrary to the Constitution and the law. It infringes a constitutional ban addressed to
the three authorities, and the People themselves. (P. 38)
As the Court concludes, “the irrefutable evidence drawn by the Court from various sources
and numerous internal and international practices” precluded the Egyptian government from
concluding the Convention or alienating part of the Egyptian territory (p. 44).
* * * *
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The Judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court sheds light on several important
questions of international law. First, the distinction between the Egyptian political
branches and the Egyptian people touches upon the locus of sovereignty in international
law. The Judgment makes clear that the sovereignty of the people survives the exercise of
the right of self-determination and remains operational in certain matters, grounding an
action by the “principal” (the people) against its “agent” (the government). The
Judgment recalls that the original holder of territorial sovereignty is and remains the peo-
ple, and it does so in a context different from that of decolonization. This is noteworthy in
light of the recent Advisory Opinion on Chagos, where the International Court of Justice
observed that it was “conscious that the right to self-determination, as a fundamental
human right, has a broad scope of application,”22 which reaches beyond decolonization.
The Court’s distinction between the principal and the agent is also operationalized through
collective participatory rights. Such rights arise in this instance from the text of the
Egyptian Constitution, but they are also increasingly recognized in international human
rights law.23
Second, the fact that such a violation may be inconsistent with international human rights
law, and that it may be characterized as such by an international body such as the African
Commission, is also noteworthy, as it could provide an approach for applying the rule cod-
iﬁed in Article 46 (provisions of internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties) of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.24 There is indeed very limited international prac-
tice on the operation of this rule25 or what constitutes a “manifest” violation of a rule of treaty-
making powers of “fundamental importance.” Inconsistency with international human rights
law may provide a persuasive ground to argue that the violation is “manifest” (ascertained by
an international body26) and the relevant rule is of “fundamental importance” (as it partakes
in the protection of human dignity).
Third, the implications of the Judgment for the “permeability” of state decision-making
powers under international law deserve a closer look. The Tiran and Sanaﬁr case raises a vari-
ety of considerations, including strategic27 and economic ones.28 But implicit in the
Judgment is another framing that focuses on the broader problématique of human rights
and power over natural resources.
22 Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago fromMauritius in 1965, AdvisoryOpinion,
at 35, para. 144 (Int’l Ct. Just. F8eb. 25, 2019); see also Diane Amann, Legal Consequences of the Separation of
the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965, 113 AJIL __ (2019).
23 Id., paras. 144–74.
24 Article 46(1) reads: “State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been expressed
in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent
unless that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance.” See Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 UNTS 331, at 343.
25 See, e.g., Case Concerning the Delimitation of Maritime Boundary Between Guinea-Bissau and Senegal,
Decision, XX RIAA 119, 139, paras. 53 et seq. (July 31, 1989) (where the rule did not apply due to Salazar’s
practice); Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Eq. Guinea
Intervening), Judgment, 2002 ICJ Rep. 303, 430, para. 265 (Oct. 10).
26 Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria, supra note 25, para. 265.
27 Feb. 15, 1954 UNSC Ofﬁcial Records, supra note 20.
28 Amina Moustapha, Saudi Arabia Announces First Project on Tiran and Sanaﬁr, EGYPT INDEP. (Oct. 25 2017),
at https://www.egyptindependent.com/saudi-arabia-announces-ﬁrst-project-tiran-sanaﬁr.
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This question has been traditionally framed as an analysis of the limits placed by human
rights—substantive and procedural—on the conduct of resource extraction activities.29
However, this framing has three shortcomings. First, it pays limited attention to human
rights, not as safeguards against natural resources-related activities, but as entitlements over
natural resources.30 Second, the prevailing framing overlooks the fact that certain limitations
of state power arise speciﬁcally from such entitlements. The question here is not about the
permissible operating space under human rights law within which natural resources-related
activities unfold (an “externality-avoidance” prism), but rather about competing entitlements
over natural resources arising from human rights. Such competing claims impose “entitle-
ment-driven” limitations on the powers of states. These limitations are different from and
additional to the externality-avoidance limitations arising from general human rights.
Third, the difference between entitlement-driven and externality-avoidance limitations of
state power has signiﬁcant practical implications. Entitlement-driven limitations offer better
legal means against the appropriation and misuse by government elites of the resources of a
people, the so-called “resource curse,”31 as well as against other governmental abuses of power
with irreversible consequences for individual and collective entitlements over natural
resources, as the Tiran and Sanaﬁr case illustrates.
As noted earlier, the Convention between Egypt and Saudi Arabia framed the question not
as a transfer of territory, the renunciation of a territorial claim, or even maritime delimitation,
but as demarcation, i.e., as a merely technical operation to establish an already existing boun-
dary. The reason for resorting to this legal denomination was likely to circumvent the enti-
tlements of the Egyptian people expressly reserved in Article 151 of the Egyptian
Constitution and to avoid the substantive and procedural limitations arising from those
entitlements. In its Judgment, the Supreme Administrative Court linked these constitutional
limitations to the original entitlement of the people (p. 15). In the absence of such entitle-
ment-driven limitations, the transfer would have been a mere territorial transaction between
two sovereign states. The people’s entitlement, if based only on an externality-avoidance logic
of procedural limitations, would not have affected the basic power of the government to relin-
quish territorial title. It is only when procedural limitations are linked to the deeper entitle-
ment of people to such territory, or its resources, that the limitations challenge not only the
manner but the very power of the government to transfer title. Thus, the Judgment implicitly
sheds light on the subtle yet important difference between externality-avoidance and entitle-
ment-driven limitations arising from human rights.
The framing of this question from a human rights perspective is not limited to the right to
self-determination. For example, Article 21 of the African Charter provides for a collective
right to dispose freely of natural resources and wealth. As in the context of Article 20
29 See, e.g., Catherine Redgwell,Contractual and Treaty Arrangements Supporting Large European Transboundary
Pipeline Projects: Can Adequate Human Rights Be Secured?, in ENERGY NETWORKS AND THE LAW: INNOVATIVE
SOLUTIONS IN CHANGING MARKETS, ch. 6 (Martha M. Roggenkamp, Lila Barrera-Hernández,
Donald N. Zillman & Iñigo del Guayo eds., 2012).
30 There is a signiﬁcant, albeit piecemeal, literature on the entitlements over natural resources arising from
human rights. See, e.g., BEN SAUL, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE, intro. (2016).
31 See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew M. Warner, Natural Resources and Economic Development: The Curse of
Natural Resources, 45 EUR. ECON. REV. 827 (2001).
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(self-determination), the jurisprudence relating to Article 21 of the African Charter leaves no
doubt that the term “peoples” refers not only to a people in a decolonization context32 but
also to the entire population of a state’s territory33 or even to indigenous peoples,34 who are
entitled to enjoy their right to freely dispose of natural resources. Thus, while the government
of each state must assume responsibility for exercising this right, it must do so in the name of
and for the beneﬁt of the people, since sovereignty over the state’s natural resources belongs to
the people.35
To further clarify the distinction between externality-avoidance and entitlement-driven
limitations of state powers, it is useful to recall a decision of the UN Human Rights
Committee (HRC), Chief Bernard Ominayak (on behalf of Lubicon Lake Band)
v. Canada.36 The complainant claimed that Canada had allowed Alberta to expropriate the
Band’s lands for private oil exploration in a way that prevented the group from enjoying its
natural resources and maintaining its traditional way of life. These actions were initially
framed through the community’s right to self-determination37 under Article 1 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).38 This collective right entails
both externality-avoidance and entitlement-driven limitations on the power of states. Indeed,
a state is not only required to enable the way of life of the relevant people (in today’s termi-
nology, to “respect, protect, and fulﬁl”) but also to recognize their entitlement over the
resources of the land. However, the Human Rights Committee held that claims alleging vio-
lation of Article 1 of the ICCPR are not justiciable.39
In an attempt to provide some measure of protection, the Committee recharacterized the
claim as a possible violation of Article 27—the individual right to enjoy one’s culture.40 By
allowing the provincial government to sign industrial development leases on traditional native
lands, the Committee found that Canada had breached Article 27.41 Through this recharac-
terization, something was gained (the admissibility of the complaint) but something was also
lost. By relying on Article 27, the Committee emphasized Canada’s obligation to respect and
protect the community’s culture and customs; in other words, it adopted an externality-
avoidance prism. But the entitlement dimension of the claim under the collective right to
self-determination fell between the cracks.
32 Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) and Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR)
v. Nigeria, Comm. 155/96, ACHPR, para. 56 (Oct. 27, 2001).
33 Front for the Liberation of the State of Cabinda v. Republic of Angola, Comm. 328/06, para. 130 (ACHPR
Nov. 5, 2013).
34 ACHPR v. Republic of Kenya (“Ogiek Case”), Judgment, App. 006/2012, paras. 195–201 (ACHPRMay 26,
2017).
35 FATSAH OUGUERGOUZ, THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS: A COMPREHENSIVE AGENDA
FOR HUMAN DIGNITY AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 287 (2002).
36 Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, Ominayak (on behalf of Lubicon Lake Band) v. Canada (“Ominayak Case”),
Merits, Comm. No. 167/1984, UN Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/45/40) (Mar. 26, 1990).
37 Id. at 2.
38 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, GA Res. 2200a (XXI), 999 UNTS 171
(entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
39 Ominayak Case, supra note 36, para. 13.3.
40 Id., para. 32.2.
41 Id., para. 33.
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The omission of the entitlement dimension in the Ominayak case is but one example of a
more general lacuna, which has so far been analyzed only in an ad hoc manner. This dimen-
sion is important for the frequent cases of resource misuse by authoritarian regimes,42 post-
apartheid land restitution in South Africa,43 and tensions between the entitlements of
states and those of peoples.44 In most legal systems, ownership of resources is vested in the
state45 and this entitlement is often spelled out at the constitutional and legislative level.46 In
such a context, international law offers limited grounds, if any, to challenge duly authorized
extractive activities that do not encroach upon general human rights (e.g., to life, health, pri-
vate and family life, etc.), even if such activities deplete natural resources and the wealth they
generate is not properly redistributed. An externality-avoidance prism of human rights merely
places certain bounds on the manner in which international dealings relating to natural
resources are conducted. From an externality-avoidance perspective, the power of the state
to grant a concession or to transfer a territory is not challenged as such; what is challenged
is its potential encroachment on human rights, which can be addressed through mitigation
measures. By contrast, an entitlement-driven prism challenges the very core of decision-mak-
ing power over resources. The original (hypothetical) delegation of powers from the people to
the government is brought back to life and ﬂeshed out, in human rights terms, to contest the
powers of the state.
In these cases, what is challenged is not merely the manner in which extractive or other
resource-related activities are conducted; it is the very entitlement to do so. The challenge
is based on a competing entitlement, a competing decision-making claim, which imposes lim-
itations on the state. The Judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court is therefore signiﬁ-
cant because it sheds light, with unusual clarity due to the peculiarity of the facts, on this
subtle but important distinction.
GINEVRA LE MOLI
Grotius Centre for International Legal Studies, Leiden University
doi:10.1017/ajil.2019.54
42 LEIF WENAR, BLOOD OIL: TYRANTS, VIOLENCE, AND THE RULES THAT RUN THE WORLD (2015).
43 See, e.g., Alexkor Ltd v. Richtersveld Community, 2003 CCT 19/03, CCSA, para. 64 (Oct. 14) (S. Afr.).
44 See, e.g., First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada et al. v. Attorney General of Canada (rep-
resenting the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development Canada), 2016 CHRT 2 (Jan. 26).
45 See Yinka Omorogbe & Peter Oniemola, Property Rights in Oil and Gas Under Domanial Regimes, in
PROPERTY AND THE LAW IN ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES 118 (Aileen McHarg, Barry Barton, Adrian
Bradbrook & Lee Godden eds., 2010).
46 See, for instance, as regards national constitutions, Article 20(XI), Constitution of the Federative Republic of
Brazil, which states that “those lands traditionally occupied by the Indians” belong to the federal government;
similarly, for decisions of national courts, see Attorney-General of the Federation v. Attorney-General of Abia
State, 2002 6 NWLR, S.C.N., 542–905 (Apr. 5) (Nigeria).
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